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JERZY MAIK
PREFACE

Medieval and early post medieval firearms and artillery were the subject matter of the 9th fascicle of ‘Fasciculi
Archaeologiae Historicae’, published in 1996, which contained the materials of the 1st International Colloquium on
Arms and Armour, held in Malbork in 1994. The present publication is devoted to the outcomes of most recent scientific
investigations conducted by specialists in arms and armour,
both archaeologists and historians. The first two papers deal
with Greek fire, which cannot be classed as a type of artillery,
but to some extent, seems to be its forerunner. It appears that
Greek fire was also used outside Byzantium, at least by the
Bulgarians and the Cumans, who, however, did not produce
this type of weapon themselves.
The following papers discuss the use of artillery and firearms at the close of the Middle Ages and the beginning of
post medieval times in the Polish, Bohemian and Teutonic
armies. All these papers as well as the papers dealing with

Greek fire are based on written records and the remaining
three contributions rely on archaeological sources.
The three papers in question are based on archaeological
weapon finds coming from excavations carried out on 18thand early 19th-century battlefields. These excavations permit
archaeologists to draw conclusions not only about the artillery and firearms which were in use at that time, but also the
contemporary battle array.
The issue of arms and armour in past centuries, firearms
and artillery included, is going to be further discussed in
‘Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae’ and looked upon from
the perspective of production technology in the near future.

Łódź, October 2012
(translated by Zuzanna Poklewska-Parra)
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ADRIAN MANDZY

USING MUNITIONS AND UNIT FRONTAGE:
NEW EVIDENCE ABOUT THE RUSSIAN MAIN BATTLE LINE AT POLTAVA (1709)
The Battle of Poltava reached its crescendo with an
all out assault of the Swedish army on the Russian camp
(Fig. 1). Swedish troops, among the best disciplined in the
world, had known many victories over the Slavs and one
good march could break the Russian line. Once this line
was broken, panic would set in as the remaining Russian
troops would begin to flee across the Vorskva River. With

a limited line of retreat, the outnumbered Swedish forces
would once again inflict a major defeat on the backwards
enemy, much like they did at Narva nine years earlier.
Shortly after 9:00 in the morning, Tsar Peter the 1st
(Pyotr Alexeyevich Romanov) ordered his troops to form
up in two lines in the open ground in front of the fortified camp to face the oncoming northerners. The first line

Fig. 1. G. C. Pingeling’s Plan 1741, Courtesy of Aleksandr Ianovych, the former Director of the National Historical Cultural Preserve
„Fields of the Battle of Poltava”.
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consisted of twenty-four infantry battalions and the second
had eighteen battalions. Between each of these battalions
were the three-pound regimental guns, which were small
light field pieces that traveled with the foot battalions.
Larger artillery pieces remained in the camp, but were
placed on elevated positions, so that they could fire over
the heads of the Russian troops and provide covering fire.
To the right of the infantry, Peter deployed eleven regiments
of dragoons, and six regiments of dragoons secured the left
Russian flank. A small reserve remained uncommitted and
was available to fill in any gaps that appeared.
Mounted on a his horse Finette, the Tsar moved out
in front of his troops as Orthodox priests sprinkled Holy
Water on the troops going into combat. By 9:45, the Swedish troops had evoked Jesus and began their move forward.
According to the popular myths that arose after the Muscovite victory, the two armies were approximately 800 meters
apart as the two massive war machines began to close in on
each other. From the start of the Swedish march, the Russian artillery gave fire on the advancing Swedes. When the
Swedes moved closer, the regimental guns began to fire
round shot and as the Balts moved closer to the Slavic lines,
the guns fired canister. According to Von Weihe, a Swedish officer who had taken part in the attack, the artillery
“mown down the troops.”1
At around forty meters, the Russian infantry fired on
their oncoming blue-coated adversaries. Yet the Swedish
line continued to advance. As trained, the Swedes halted,
fired a volley and then charged the Russian line. The first
Russian line on the Swedish right began to be pushed back
and Russian troops began to flee. On the Swedish left, the
Russian Guard regiments exploited a gap in the Swedish
line and began to push back the Swedish advance. With not
enough troops to cover the open ground, a gap appeared
in the Swedish line. As the Swedish attack began to break
up, it stalled and the initiative passed to the Russians. The
Muscovites began to send in more troops and the Swedish lines began to sway. As the Swedes began to withdraw,
their departure from the field of glory quickly turned into
a route. Before noon, the new model army created by Peter
had changed the balance of power in Europe forever.2
This story, more or less, has been told for almost three
hundred years. The greatness of Peter, the superiority of
Russian firepower over Swedish bayonets, and the overall
folly of the Swedish invasion has been analyzed, studied
and taught to generations of military officers throughout
the world. Napoleon, before advancing on to Moscow in
1812, wrestled with these issues, as did Imperial German
and Nazi officers during the two world wars. Yet how
much of this story is true and how much it was fabricated
1
P. England, The Battle That Shook Europe: Poltava and
the Birth of the Russian Empire, London 1992.
2
Ch. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, London
1981.
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to further a political agenda? Accounts from the battle are
mostly one sided. With the destruction of the Swedish army
at Poltava and the loss of the Royal Chancellery, the Swedish documentary record is rather sparse. The relatively high
level of literacy in early modern Sweden allowed for the
survivors from the campaign who eventually returned to
Sweden after years or even decades of captivity to compiled memories, but how accurate and selective was their
memory remains unclear. Worse is the fact that generals
and officers often try to shift blame for failure on others
and often over or under estimate, consciously or unconsciously, particular events. The documentary records from
the Cossack faired even worse, as these were intentionally
destroyed in 1775 by Peter’s greatest emulator, the Empress
Catherine. Therefore, the best primary historical documentary information comes from Russian sources.
These sources, however, are also rather selective. Like
the painter who composes a portrait for a particular audience, any records concerning the de facto founder of the
Russian Empire are inevitably positive. Given that Peter
was not above modifying history to fit into his particular
perspective, politically sensitive materials would undoubtedly been changed to fit the official version of events. Criticism of the regime or of the Tsar was not tolerated during
Peter’s reign, so it is unlikely any record of discord would
have survived into the twenty-first century.
Yet some variations do show up in the documentary
record. Most pictures of the battle, either as specific drawing of the battlefield or as background setting for heroic
portraits, illustrate the Russian camp. Most often the camp
is shown to be almost square in shape and fortified on three
sides with massive earthen walls, ditches and flat firing
platforms. The official plan of the battle, often referred
to as Peter’s Plan, shows a very formal, but much longer,
rectangular shape. Other illustrations, however, show an
irregular trapezoid shaped structure. More recent twentieth
century reconstructions, such as that of Bennedich’s plan
from 1911, try to place an irregular square shaped trapezoid on top of the current topography.3 Unfortunately, these
more recent reconstructions were influenced by the series
of military fortifications that were built on the battlefield in
the mid nineteenth century.
Indeed, shortly after the Crimean War, the Poltava
military school, which was initially established by Peter
to commemorate his victory, decided to re-create a series
of fortifications on the battlefield in time for the 150-year
anniversary. While popular assumptions suggest that
these recreations were built on the ruins of the previous
earthworks, we know that in the early years of the nineteenth century the entire battlefield area was evened out
so that Tsar Alexander I could have an unobstructed view

K. Bennedich, Karl XII:s krigföring 1707-1709 och krigsskådeplatsens natur och kultur,1911.
3
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of the Grand Review of the Russian Army during the 1809
Centennial Celebrations. Generally, such leveling of the
ground – filling in holes by scrapping off the top soil from
high points – is limited in its scope, especially before the
advent of steam and gas powered earth moving machines.
Yet in the Russian Empire, serfs were plentiful, cheap and
were employed in various mundane tasks. While we have
no documentary evidence about how much of the terrain
was moved, the presence of His Imperial Majesty would
undoubtedly have resulted in a concerted effort to make the
battlefield as royalty friendly as possible.
Thus, when we began to look at the battle, what evidence could be used to challenge or even verify the official tale told by the state? How did the main attack on the
Russian camp develop? How close did the Swedish troops
come to victory? Prior to the archaeological survey of what
is thought to be the main battlefront area, we conducted
a re-creation of the battle lines from the existing Russian
Orders of Battle. A record of where each regiment stood in
relationship to each other was compiled on the direct orders
of Peter. This information is commonly available and was
published along the edge of the map shortly after the battle
as a record of Peter’s accomplishment. Often referred to as
Tsar Peter’s Plan, this map lists the Russian and Swedish
Order of Battle along the bottom of the page.
From this list we can determine that the first line
contained twenty-four infantry battalions. A battalion,
according to the Regulations of 1704, consisted of four
companies of musketeers.4 The reforms of 1708 stripped
the single company of grenadiers from the regiment and
placed them in converged Grenadier regiments, with only
a few select regiments keeping their grenadiers with the
parental unit. To augment the firepower of the Russian
infantry, two three-pound guns were deployed with each
regiment. The two Guard regiments were significantly
larger. Preobrazhanski Guard Regiment had four battalions
and a special unit of bombadiers equipped with hand mortars. The Semenovski Guard Regiment was also enlarged
and had three battalions. To augment the firepower of these
two privileged units, the guard kept their grenadiers and
had enlarged batteries of regimental artillery.
The battalion guns had an interesting history. These
guns were designed to keep pace with an infantry regiment
and were light enough to be man-handled by the infantry.
The older regimental guns in the Russian arsenal weighted
over 48 poods (a bit under 800 kilograms), but in 1706
a new regimental gun was created by Korchmin. Not only
were the new guns half the weight of the older design, but
they also had two six-pound mortars attached to the front
of the carriage. These mortars were designed to launch grenades and were to augment the piece when it was firing

O. Leonov, I. Ul’ianov, Rehuliarnaia pekhota 1698-1801,
Moskva 1995.
4

grape shot. As a rule, these two battalion guns were formed
into a two-gun battery.
According to the Peter’s manual, Rules of Combat,
a battalion was to deploy in the Anglo-Dutch model, that is
in four ranks.5 Troops were trained to fire by volley or by
platoons in the Prussian fashion. Like in the Swedish army,
one out of every five soldiers was equipped with a pike.
Unlike earlier formations in which the pike formed the center of the unit and the musket armed troops were placed
on the flanks, both the Russian and Swedish armies intermixed their pikemen with their muskets. In such a way, the
battalion was protected from cavalry and could maintain
a significant volley of fire. This fire was also augmented
with the fire provided by the battalion guns which were
deployed with each regiment.
On paper, the regulation strength of a company was
one hundred and fifty men.6 In 1704, the company was
commanded by a captain and included one lieutenant,
one ensign, three non-commissioned officers, one armorer,
one doctor barber, one adjutant, one clerk, six corporals,
two drummers, and one hundred thirty-three soldiers.7
On campaign this number would have been reduced by
sickness, battle casualties, and desertions. Estimates of the
actual strength of each company vary, but using an average
of one hundred to one hundred twenty five men suggests
that each battalion could field approximately between four
and five hundred men.
Since each battalion was deployed in four lines, the front
line or frontage consisted on the average of one hundred to
one hundred and twenty five men per battalion. Using the
smaller number of a hundred men frontage per battalion,
the twenty-four battalions in the first line would represent
a minimum of 2400 men. As an individual is widest at his
shoulders, each individual would take up between thirty
and forty centimeters. Given that the individual would
be required to undertake a manual of arms, this frontage
increases to fifty-six centimeters per person.8 Multiplying
the space required for individual (56cm) by the minimal
number of troops (2400), then we arrive at a figure of 1344
meters for all the troopers standing shoulder to shoulder in
one continuous line in front of the Russian camp. If we use
the larger number of 125 troops in the first line of a battalion, then we arrive at a distance of 1680 meters.
Of course, no battalion would have been stood directly
next to another unit. For the first part, the battalion guns
would require space to deploy. Each two three-pound

O. Sokyrko, Ukrains’kyj Rubikon: Poltavs’ka bytva 27
chervnia 1709 g., Part 2, Kiev 2009, p. 15.
6
A. Konstam, Poltava 1709, Russia Comes of Age, London,
1994, p. 21.
7
A. Konstam, Peter the Great’s Army 1: Infantry, London,
1993, p. 17.
8
B. P. Hughes, Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the
Battlefield, 1630-1850, Staplehurst, Kent 1997, p. 80.
5
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gun battalion battery had a crew of twelve men servicing
the guns. While the number of infantrymen would rarely
maintain its theoretical paper strength, gun crews were
always brought up to full strength before the start of an
engagement. Guns were too important to leave undermanned and replacement gunners would have been taken
out of the line to service the guns. If we follow the order of
deployed battalions, then we can also calculate a frontage
of the twelve three-pound regimental batteries that served
on the front lines.
The exact dimensions of each three-pound battalion
gun varied between designs, but on the average, the gun
measured two meters from wheel hub to wheel hub. To service the guns, its crew needed to move freely between the
front and the back of the piece. This required at least one
meter of space on each side of the gun. If we take the minimum required space of four meters per gun, a minimum
of eight meters in width is taken up by a single gun battery. Thus, the twelve battalion gun batteries had to take up
a frontage of at least ninety-six meters.
Taken together, the twenty-four battalions and twelve
batteries of three-pound guns took up a frontage of approximately 1440 to 1776 meters. From Peter’s plan, however,
we also know that the cavalry was also deployed on the
flanks of the infantry. At the time of the Poltava campaign,
Peter had expanded his cavalry to thirty-four regiments of
dragoons – eleven of these regiments were deployed to the
right of the infantry and six on the left. Dragoon regiments
were made up of ten or twelve companies, each of which had
a paper strength of about one hundred men. Illness, fatigue
and injured mounts would reduce this number to about
seventy saddles per company. Two companies of dragoons
formed a squadron. Cavalry regiments would also deploy
in three ranks and maintained a frontage of four or at times
five companies. If we take the minimum of a two squadrons
frontage per dragoon regiment, we can calculate the space
needed for deployment.
Horses are notoriously hard to control, even at the
best of situations. A perusal of any historical period
were cavalry played an important role shows that horses
often panicked and were almost impossible to stop after
they began a charge. For this reason, cavalry manuals
always seem to stress the need to slowly advance toward
the enemy and work up to a charge in the last moments
before contact. As the cavalry forces in Peter’s army were
relatively new and poorly trained, especially when compared with their Swedish counterpart, the Russian cavalry was trained to advance at the trot and discharge their
firearms approximately thirty meters from their enemy.
Once the initial volley had somewhat dispersed the enemy,
the Russian cavalry manual stated that the troopers were
to draw swords and advance at the trot. The school book
emphasis of keeping such slow speeds was put into place
so that the dragoons could maintain their unit cohesion.
As the dragoons advanced, they strove not to leave any
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gaps between the men in the front lines and charged the
enemy in the classic cavalry formation of riding ”boot
to boot”.
Riding “boot to boot” theoretically is not to leave any
spaces between the riders. However, even when riding in
this formation, gaps of ten to twenty centimeters quickly
emerge between riders. Given that a rider and his horse
occupy approximately a meter wide frontage, in the field
a single dragoon company would occupy approximately
eighty-four meters. A single regiment would therefore
occupy four times that space, or 336 meters. Thus, the
right cavalry wing would require just under 3700 meters to
deploy, while the left wings would take up a frontage of just
over 2000 meters.
Based on this analysis, the Russian army, according to
the official records provided by Peter, would require a significant amount of space to deploy. On the whole, the Russian army occupied a frontage of almost eight kilometers
in length. If the cavalry were not deployed in line, but were
placed one regiment behind another, this would reduce the
initial deployment area significantly.
According to Peter’s Plan, the Russian army held the
position of between the Takhtaulov Stream to the north
and eroded streambed of the Iakivtsi Stream to the south.
While the topography has been changed with the construction of a railroad cut in the eroded streambed of the Iakivtsi
Stream, the distance between these two points of reference
is under 1,800 meters. Given that the minimal deployment area for the infantry and supporting battalion guns
is between 1,440 and 1,776 meters, the cavalry had little
to no space to maneuver, much less deploy properly into
line. Indeed, the infantry would be hard pressed and had
no space to wheel in line. Perhaps the Russian deployment
in front of the camp was a measure undertaken to give
the Imperial Muscovite army room to deploy before being
attacked by a professional and aggressive foe.
Given the compacted nature of the Russian line and the
descriptions of concentrated Russian fire, there was a strong
indication that an archaeological battlefield survey would
uncover large quantities of materials.9 Two senior scholars
in the project had worked in areas heavily impacted by modern development and both had found traces of the former
fields of conflict. Being aware of the ferocious nature of the
battle, the amount of troops deployed, and the amount of
ordinance expended, the team had envisioned finding huge
deposits of spent ordinance.

An invitation from V. Vadimov, the general city architect of Poltava, to Prof. M. Bevz, the Chair of the Department
of Restoration and Reconstruction of Architectural Complexes at
the National University “L’viv Polytechnic” resulted in the author
visiting the battlefield. After a series of discussions and meetings,
an international Ukrainian, American and Swedish team came
together under my direction for two seasons and examined the
numerous military conflicts that took place at Poltava.
9
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Unfortunately, this never occurred.10 Although we were
able to recover a significant sample of spent ordinance,
most of the military artifacts found on the area of the main
battlefield came from the Second World War. Quantities of
spent shell casings littered the battle areas, with spent 8mm
Mauser cartridges being the most common artifact. Soviet
Mosin-Nagant ammunition also was recovered in large
quantities, as were spent 9mm pistol cartridges. Given the
amount of ordinance expended on the Eastern Front, it was
not surprising that we recovered an unexploded 76mm German anti-tank round.
The recovery of WWII ordinance indicates that the
local topography was not significantly modified in recent
years. Earth moving projects, be it grading for a parking
lot or the removal of topsoil, have become more prevalent
with the advent of gasoline and stream powered machinery.
Such grand projects were also very popular in the Soviet
Union and used in two areas of the Poltava battlefield. In the
area just to the south of the historical museum, the ground
was moved and scrapped to construct protective earthen
walled barriers for the aviation fuel storage facilities of the
air force base. Yet for most of the battlefield, the recovery
of distinct concentrations of fired ordinance not only lets
us reconstruct German MG firing positions, but provides
us with a clear indication that the earth was not subject to
significant impact following 1945.
While the two seasons of metal detecting failed to
recover hundreds of pieces of ammunition from the 1709
engagement, those found provide a good sample to help
us understand the battle. The overwhelming majority of
rounds recovered were Russian.11 This is not surprising,
as the Russian doctrine emphasized firepower and the
Swedish practice of ga pa focused on maintaining momentum during the advance. While some scholars have focused
on the question of the quality and the available Swedish
gunpowder, military theorists of the eighteenth century
were loathed to have troops engage in a protracted firefight.
Not only did this allow the attacker to suffer greater casualties, but there was a great possibility that the initiative
would pass and the charge would fail to materialize.
An analysis of the ammunition showed two different types of projectiles, lead small arms ammunition, that
which would have been fired from muskets, pistols and
carbines, and lead anti-personnel artillery ordinance which
would have been fired from artillery. This anti-personnel
artillery ordinance consisted of lead or at time iron balls

A. Mandzy, Doslidzhennia poliv Poltavs’kukh bytv na zemliakh derzhavnoho-kul’turnoho zapovidnyka „pole poltavs’koi
butvy”, „Arkhitektura, Visnyk natsional’noho universytetu
L’vivs’ka politekhnika”, L’viv, No. 632, 2008, pp. 146-149.
11
A. Mandzy, M. Bevz, Kompleksne doslidzhennia istorychnoho polia bytvy: metodyka i dosvid mizhnarodnoi arkhekturho-arkheolohichnoi ekspedytsii, „Fortress”, vol. 1, L’viv 2009,
pp. 550-558.
10

held together in a cloth bag (grape shot), or a tin canister
(canister shot). At close ranges, this ammunition made the
cannon into a very large shotgun, as it disbursed hundreds
of pieces of metal into the oncoming enemy.
To date, eleven pieces of anti-personnel ammunition
have been found on the main battle lines. This includes
a pewter fragment from a canister round, nine lead pieces
and one iron piece. The nine lead pieces can be divided
into four categories, poured small rounds balls with a diameter between 10.0mm and 13.4mm, folded cube shaped lead
with a diameter of 13.3mm, poured cubes shaped pieces
with a diameter between 15.3mm and 16.1mm and poured
cubes between 19mm and 20mm. A fifth type of ordinance
is represented by the recovery of a single cubed iron piece.
While the sample size is too small for any useful statistical
comparisons, the existence of five distinct groupings suggests variations in the manufacturing and supply of artillery based anti-personnel ammunition.
It is generally assumed that the artillery in Peter’s
army played a significant role in the main battle.12 Given
the special limitations for deployment faced by the Russian
forces, the heavy artillery remained in the rear. Although
the records indicate that they were raised on platforms and
fired over the heads of the Muscovite troops, any such bombardments would have made these direct fire weapons into
mortars. While some of the guns in Peter’s arsenal were
indeed specifically designed mortars, the majority were
made to fire over open sights directly into the enemy in
front. Such limitations in fields of fire were not unusual, and
in the seventeenth century, heavy field guns were modified
to achieve a much arc of fire by digging a hole to lower the
back of the gun carriage into the ground.13 However, antipersonnel ammunition could not be used in such a manner. Given the irregular flight patterns of anti-personnel
ammunition, neither canister nor grape shot could be fired
into the enemy without causing significant casualties to the
troops directly in front of the guns. Thus, the fragments
of canister recovered were fired from the Russian threepound battalion guns that were stationed directly in front
with the infantry.
The most commonly recovered battlefield related items
found during this survey were musket balls. Made of lead,
these projectiles were notoriously inaccurate and required
groups to fire a volley at a mass target with the hope of producing casualties. While some sources suggest that musket fire could be effective beyond 100 meters, a series of
test run by the Prussian army during the Napoleonic wars
found that the British musket, relatively the same model as
used at Poltava in 1709, was able hit a man sized target at
eighty yards only forty-seven percent of the time.14 Given
12

p. 76.

13
14

J. V. Shokarev, Istoriia opuzhuia artilleriia, Moskva 2001,
E. Wagner, Ars Bella Gerendi, Praha 1980, p. 163.
G. Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets, London 1996, p. 32.
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that these were paper targets and the troops were not actually in combat, this number would have been significantly
lower under real battlefield conditions. This theoretical
exercise is supported by Griffith’s analysis of British firing patterns during the Peninsula Campaign (1809-1814).15
Using contemporary source descriptions of the battles,
Griffith argues that while musket firing could begin at
ranges greater than 100 yards, British troop usually began
to shoot at 75 yards.
The inaccuracies of firearms were well known in the
eighteenth century. Troops were taught to give fire and
aiming at individual targets was discouraged. Some legendary commands like Frederick the Great of Prussia
and Gustaph Adolphus of Sweden preferred to charge the
enemy directly, rather than allowing their troops to fire and
get drawn into a long firefight. Along with the ever-larger
armies, European armies maintained the longstanding tradition of employing small groups of marksmanship. Unlike
the masses who were taught to fire blindly, marksmen
trained and developed their skills from an early age. Marksmen, usually hunters of game or members of urban shooting
clubs, learned to increase the accuracy of the weapons by
decreasing windage, i.e. the difference between the diameter of the ball and the diameter of the barrel. As all weapons were loaded from the barrel, the only practical way of
reducing windage was to wrap the ball in greased cloth
patch. As the loading of a patched ball often required the
use of a hammer to push the round down the barrel, such
loading was done previous to the start of an engagement.
Traces of such a patch were noted on a ball recovered from
the 1677 Landskrona Battlefield.16 A similar patch ball was
recovered during the author’s excavation of the 1782 Battle
of Blue Licks.17
To date, two Swedish musket balls were recovered at
Poltava. While these balls are similar to some of the balls
used by the Russians, the weight of the Swedish balls is significantly greater. The Swedish balls, which have a diameter of 18.8mm to 19.7mm, weight 35.3g and 37.5g respectively. Russian balls of the same diameter are on the average
ten grams lighter. Even largest Russian musket balls, one of
which is almost 21mm in diameter, weighs 3 grams less
than a Swedish ball which is 19.7mm in diameter.
The Russian ordinance recovered from our excavations
is best described as mixed. From the small sample of fiftysix balls, four or possible five distinct ammunition types
were noted in the area of the Russian camp. Of these, round
Russian balls were the most commonly encountered ammunition. The other types of munitions recovered include:

15
R. Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of
Napoleon, New Haven 1998, p. 81.
16
B. Knarrström, S. Larsson, Hans Majestäts Friskyttar av
Danmark, Stockholm 2008, p. 109.
17
A. Mandzy, E. Hale J. Marin, A Phase I Survey of the Blue
Licks Battlefield, Frankfort 2008, p. 24.
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extended sprue ordinance, two types of cold-hammered
improvised munitions and slugs (Fig. 2).
Although it would be nice to always link a particular
weapon based upon the diameter of an individual ball, both
the nature of black powder firearms and contemporary
manufacturing techniques resulted in bullets being made
to rather loose tolerances. The British Brown Bess musket, which had a .75 bore, was to use a ball of 0.693-inch
diameter, but in practice, balls in the range of 0.67 to 0.73
are generally attributed to this weapon.18 In addition, not
only were variations in the size of rounds balls common,
but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, different size calibers were often used contemporaneously. For
example, excavations of the wreck of the Swedish warship Solen, which sank during the Battle of Oliwa on 28
November 1627, produced 466 pieces of small arms ammunition, of which four specific sizes were identified: 17mm
(the most common), 14mm, 11mm and 21mm.19
Thirty-one round balls were recovered from the main
area. Some of these balls exhibit traces of casting sprues,
but in all of these examples, the sprue has been cut very
closely to the ball itself. The most common type of ball
measured between 9.3mm and 11.8mm, with the majority in
the 10mm range. These may relate to buckshot, that is multiple small balls fired out a larger caliber musket, or relate to
smaller caliber weapons.20 A second possible concentration
of round balls appears to be in the 14mm range, with bullets
varying in size from 13.2mm to 15.8mm. A third possible
grouping may exist between the 17.3mm to 19.0mm range.
Though only four balls of this size were recovered, these
balls are all significantly larger than the previous grouping
and are thought to represent different weapons. Finally, the
recovery of 12.1mm round ball and 20.8mm ball may represent the use of different weapon systems, but the single
recovery of each size does not allow us to state much more
than record their presence.
In addition to round balls, seventeen balls were recovered at Poltava with extended sprues. These are round
balls with the casting sprue intentionally left on the ball.
The recovery of impacted balls with visible sprues indicates
that these rounds were fired with the sprues still attached.
Unlike eighteenth century cartridges, where both the ball

18
D. M. Sivilich, What the Musket Ball Can Tell: Monmouth
Battlefield State Park, [in:] Fields of Conflict, ed. D. Scott, New
Jersey 2007, p. 86.
19
A. Koperkiewicz, Solen, Gdańsk 1986.
20
Since most oriental „Turkish” weapons in the museums
of Poland and Ukraine have a much smaller caliber bore than
muskets, the initial study suggested that these bullets correspond
with Ottoman weapons. Further analysis of Ottoman weapons
captured by the Christian forces following the 1683 Siege of Vienna by the author at the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, however, suggests that many seventeenth century Ottoman weapons
had a larger diameter than the Ottoman firearms commonly found
in the museums of Poland and Ukraine.
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Fig. 2. Lead projectiles recovered
at Poltava battlefield and recreated
ammunition. 1 – Extended Sprue
Ordinance; 2 – jug-shaped ammunition; 3 – slug; 4-5 – examples of recreated jug shaped rounds made by
cold hammering round lead balls.

and powder were inside a paper tube, makers of seventeenth
century cartridges used the sprue to attach the ball to the
paper tube. While such cartridges may have been in use by
the mid-sixteenth century, in 1697, Saint Remy, a French
scholar, “illustrated a cartridge with a ball attached by its
sprue as the latest type.21
The presence of the extended sprue shifts the center
of gravity of the bullet forward. This is the opposite of
round balls, which have their center of gravity at the mid
point. Like a modern air-gun pellet or skirted shotgun slug,
the presence of the extended sprue adds additional weight
to the bullet. Upon impact, the low velocity round will
either split, creating two separate wound cavities, or tumble
and make a much larger hole than would a round ball of the
same caliber.
The most common sprue ordinance recovered from the
main battle area of Poltava has a diameter between 14.6mm
and 16.3mm. Ten of such size ordinance was recovered,
with six balls displaying a diameter of 15mm. A second
possible grouping of balls measures between 17.3mm and
18.6mm, but with only four balls recovered, it is difficult
to say anything with certainty. The recovery of a single
extended sprue ordinance ball with a diameter of 21.6mm
is interesting, but again the lack of additional balls of this
size does not allow for further speculation.

Excavations of other battlefields in Ukraine and Sweden have recovered similar extended sprue ordinance. Excavation of the 1649 Zboriv battlefield by the author found
extended sprue ammunition in two sizes.22 The most common rounds have a diameter between 12.6mm and 13.3mm.
These are the most common type of seventeenth century
small arms ordinance recovered at Zboriv and make up
almost fifty percent of the assemblage. Less common are
the slightly larger rounds that have a diameter of 14.1mm to
14.7mm. Larger caliber weapons do not appear to have used
sprue ammunition and utilized the more traditional round
ball pattern.
A similar situation was noted during the author’s excavation of the 1649 Zbarazh battlefield.23 Fought just days
previous to the Battle of Zboriv by many of the same Cossack and Tatar troops, it was logical to assume that we would
discover similarities between the two assemblages. Indeed,
not only did we find that two sizes of extended sprue ordinance and the three diameters of round ball ammunition
noted at Zboriv were all recovered at Zbarazh, but as in
Zboriv, the percentages between the different types and
sizes of ammunition were very similar. The only difference
between the ammunition from the two sites was the recovery of large round lead balls from the Zbarazh battlefield.
A. Mandzy, Tatars, Cossacks, and the Polish Army the
Battle of Zboriv, [in:] Fields of Conflict…, pp. 193-207.
23
A. Mandzy, Doslidzhennia oblohy Zbarazha 1649 r.,
„Dezhava ta Armiia, Visnyk natsional’noho universytetu L’vivs’ka
politekhnika”, L’viv, No. 571, 2006, pp. 124-130.
22

P. Surirey de Saint Remy, Memoires d’Artillerie, second
edition, Vol. 2, Paris 1707, as quoted in Harold L. Peterson, Arms
and Armor in Colonial America 1526-1783, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 1956, p. 64.
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These large balls measure in diameter between 20.4mm
and 20.6mm.
The presence of sprue ammunition indicates that the
Russian troops at Poltava were using cartridges. The use
of cartridges simplified the loading process and resulted in
a faster rate of fire. Previously, musketeers relied upon bandoleers of pre-measured powder charges. Bandoleers were
cheap to produce and continued to be found in European arsenals until the end of the seventeenth century. Infantry cartridge boxes, however, were new and were in use in Ukraine
as early as 1649.24 Russian troops first began to use leather
cartridge boxes in the last years of the seventeenth century
under the direct reforms implemented by Peter.
The two types cold-hammered ammunition are rare and
may have only been used in this engagement. Both of these
types appear to have been modified to fit smaller size diameter barrels. The first type of modification begins by taking
a standard extended sprue ordinance ball and cold hammering it on its sides to reduce the balls diameter. Although
lead is a rather soft substance, it is difficult to directly
hammer the ball. Rather than directly hammering the ball
straight on, the ball was hammer on an angle. This procedure shifted the lead away from the sprue and produced
a jug shaped bullet, with the sprue creating the “mouth”
of the jug-shape. The three recovered jugs had their diameters reduced to 15.8mm, 16.3mm and 16.6mm respectively.
The second modified type of ordinance appears to
have been hammered on all sides. This technique seems
to be cruder than the jug style balls and was made by cold
hammering a round ball to produce a multi-sided bullet.
The lack of a sprue by which to hold the ball when hammering would have made it more difficult to modify the
shape of this ammunition and the three recovered pieces all
are slightly wider one on side. The three recovered pieces
measure 14.8mm, 15.9mm and 17.4mm.
The modified cold hammered balls suggest a temporary solution to supply the Russian troops in the field.
While it is possible that these modifications were done to
increase the lethal power of the more rounded bullets, it is
more likely that these modifications were done so that the
issued balls could fit down the barrel of a soldier’s weapon.
The����������������������������������������������������
���������������������������������������������������
lack of standard weapons and correspondingly, standard barrel diameters, was a well known feature in Peter’s
army. Since it would have been nearly impossible to deliver
the correct size ball for each individual firearm, each individual trooper would have needed to make allowances for
such discrepancies. If the delivered balls were too small,
they still could be shoved down the barrel and while not
as accurate as a correct sized round, they still would be

lethal at a point blank range. This philosophy of military
logistics remained prevalent in Imperial and later Soviet
military planning, and arms production was set up so that
capture ordinance could be used with Russian arms (i.e. the
Soviet 82mm mortar was designed to fire the 81mm NATO
mortar rounds).
If the issued balls were too larger however, then steps
would be needed to ensure the ammunition would work.
Cold hammering of rounds would ensure that the issue balls
would fit down the barrel of each firearm – and it did not
matter if the gun was a modern French import, an older
weapon from Holland or recently produced arm from one
of the Tzar’s new arsenals. Since the tools and skills required
to produce these modifications could be easily applied in
the field, it is most probable that these modifications were
undertaken to address the logistical issues that plagues
Peter’s newly created Western-styled military force.
The final type of ammunition recovered from the 1709
battlefield is cylindrical shot, also known as a slug. Whether
these poly-sided balls were cold hammered from a piece of
cut lead rod or from a slightly larger ball is impossible to
tell, but unlike the hammer round balls described above,
no part of the bullet is wider than the other. Such bullets
are periodically encountered at seventeenth and eighteenth
century assemblages and the two slugs recovered at Poltava had a diameter of 13.7mm and 15.8mm respectively.
At the 1651 Berestechko battlefield, for example, a number of cylindrical pieces of lead, along with scrap pieces
of lead, were recovered from an ammunition pouch attributed to fallen rebel peasant.25 The recovery of ten cylindrical bullets and fifteen round balls from a cartridge box at
the 1690 Anse aux Bouleaux shipwreck is a good indication that these munitions were used by New England militia
troop on their way to attack Canada.26 Five slugs were also
found in a leather pouch on the pirate ship Whydah which
sank in 1717.27
At Poltava, it appears that the Russian army used all
types of bullets in its various weapons. If we were to combine all the ammunition together and sort it by diameter,
we are not much closer to discerning any distinct patterns.
While we can see some clustering of diameters, one with
a range between 14.1mm and 16.6, and a second range
between 9.3mm and 11.8mm, these bullets represent still
only make up sixty-five percent of the total assemblage.
The diversity of recovered bullet diameters is truly remarkable and illustrates an army using every possible firearm
that it could get its hands on.
When Peter began to reform his army, the troops used
a variety of weapons and no regulation patterns existed.

The recovery of extended sprue ordinance at both Zboriv
and Zbarazh document the use of paper cartridges in 1649, while
the recovery of actual leather and wood cartridge boxes from
the 1651 Berestechko battlefield illustrates their common usage.
I. K. Sveshnikov, Bytva pid Berestechkom, L’viv 1993.

I. K. Sveshnikov, Bytva pid Berestechkom…, p. 254.
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D. M. Sivilich, G. W. Stone, The Battle of Monmouth: The
Archaeology of Molly Pitcher, the Royal Highlanders, and Colonel Cilley’s Light Infantry, Freehold 2003, p. 18.
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Local production of weapons was limited to the Kremlin
Armory and most weapons were either matchlocks or used
the newer Baltic lock snaphaunces. Peter’s efforts in establishing local centers of arms production is well documented, with weapons being produced in Tula, Moscow,
Olonetz and Petersburg. The monarch’s interest in modernizing his military also lead to his purchasing of arms in
Western Europe, especially Amsterdam. Within the Russian army, the infantry firearms could be have been made
by the Dutch, English, French, Muscovites or any other
production center.
This inconsistence in firearms was noticeable at the
regimental level. Sizes, weights, and calibers of weapons
varied and no standardization existed. According to Peter’s
notes, infantry muskets were to fire an eight zolotnik ball
(approximately 34g.), but how often this was achieved is
debatable. According to Aleksandr Ianovych, the former director of the National Historical Cultural Preserve
“Fields of the Battle of Poltava”, among a surviving historical arms in the Tula Arsenal that date to the time of
the Poltava campaign is a musket with a 16mm bore. Yet
how common was the caliber from this individual firearm
remains speculative.
In the Russian army, standardization of weapons
continued to be a long-term problem. While the capture
of large quantities of Swedish arms would go a long way
of replacing the oldest and least effective firearms, the army
that Peter created would continue to be plagued by weapon
shortages on and off for the next few hundred years. Given
the vast numbers of troops in the Russian military, similar

disparities would show up during times of crises. During
Napoleon’s invasion, various weapons were pressed into
service, including captured French muskets, purchased
British muskets, and even war trophies taken from campaigns against the Turks. But the development of a theoretical standardized round indicates a move toward greater
standardization.
Conclusions
So what does the information recovered from the
main battle line tell us about the battle? For the first part,
we know that the Russian army was confined in a spot that
was very narrow, too narrow in fact to properly deploy the
cavalry. The lack of any archaeological evidence for large
caliber cannon, such as those that would have been part
of the artillery train, also supports the fact these cannons
were employed in a supporting role at best and were not
used to their full potential. Finally, the recovered ammunition tells us that the Russian Army was truly using a wide
variety of ammunition. Unlike the Swedes, who maintained a standard ammunition caliber, the Russians were
forced to use whatever weapons came their way. Indeed, the
lack of standardization of ammunition into distinct sizes
is a good indication that the firearms used by the troops
were also not standardized. However, the use of extended
sprue ordinance also demonstrates that while the firearms
and ammunition supply may not have been standardized,
the new Russian army was adopting cartridge boxes and on
the path to modernization.

Streszczenie
Użycie uzbrojenia i długość linii frontu:
nowe dowody w sprawie głównej rosyjskiej linii bojowej pod Połtawą (1709 r.)
Dwa sezony badań pola bitwy pod Połtawą dostarczyły
nowych informacji na temat szwedzkiego ataku na główne
siły rosyjskie. Prace terenowe wykazały, że armia rosyjska była ograniczona wąską przestrzenią i nie była w stanie
w pełni wykorzystać swojej kawalerii i artylerii. Analiza
pocisków do broni ręcznej wykazała szeroką różnorodność
kalibrów i rodzajów używanej amunicji. Dwa typy pocisków wydzielone podczas badań nie zostały dotychczas

znalezione na innych XVII- lub XVIII-wiecznych polach
bitew. Badania wykazały, że wojska rosyjskie modyfikowały ołowiane kule poprzez zmniejszenie ich średnicy
w celu dopasowania do używanej broni palnej, natomiast
stosowanie pocisków z nieusuniętym kanałem wlewowym
sugeruje, że rosyjska armia była dopiero w trakcie wprowadzania do użytku ładownic.
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